To date, no clear and reasonable assessment has been made of the so-called “Velvet Revolution” in 2018. However, it is of paramount importance, because today, unable to attain nationwide unity, society continues to be divided into several opposing groups: blacks and whites, past and present, the “Karabaghtsi-Hayastantsi” schism, etc. This is, perhaps, the main result of the street-born grouping’s "mission" during these years, the rest are the consequences. Our inability to make an accurate assessment does not allow us to move forward, look for ways out and break the created deadlock. Let's try to voice the most popular public misconceptions about the events of 2018.

• In 2018, young people raised a rebellion and wanted changes, the goal of which was the fight against corruption, patronage, illegality, and election fraud  and manipulations. The movement was spontaneous and sincere.
• This was a conspiracy coordinated by the West against the Armenian people, which had the task not only of undermining our national value system and ceding Artsakh to Azerbaijan but also of isolating Russia and Iran from each other and ultimately dividing these countries.
• The "Velvet Revolution" was the result of the West-Russia struggle, where Russia is unable to resist the "soft power" technologies of the West. From this point of view, it follows that the actors of the "revolution" are agents imported from abroad.
• The "revolution" was organized by Serzh Sargsyan in order to "put the Artsakh issue in Nikol's pocket," that is, unable to resist the pressures of Russia and/or the West, he put the responsibility of handing over the territories on the poor “simpleton." A sub-version of this scheme is also the claim that Serzh Sargsyan and Nikol Pashinyan acted pursuant to a pre-agreed plan. According to that standpoint, it was an internal conspiracy against the Armenian people.
• There is also a point of view of "Russian-Turkish" conspiracy, according to which these countries reached a shadow agreement to hand over Artsakh and the remaining territories to Azerbaijan, and there is a "5th column" in Armenia, first of all, in the army, which, allegedly, secretly supports that plan. In this sense, Pashinyan presents himself as a victim rather than the key actor in this scheme.

These seem to be the main concepts being generated in the public. There are also perspectives on the combined versions of two or more of the above-mentioned ones taken together.

Naturally, these views prevent finding a way out of the predicament, because if there is mistrust in the political leaders of Armenia, then any regime change can be seen as a continuation of such scenarios, and the people's discontent and agitation are just a tool to ensure the continuation of similar conspiracies. This may be the reason for the lack of demand for new players in Armenia.

In fact, it turns out to be a useless whirlpool, a new link in another chain of conspiracy, the actors of which start everything from a new page, and the public is left empty-handed and feels cheated every time.