Monday, 25 November 2024

E Editorial

Buffer states and destinies

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Any country, especially smaller ones like Armenia, where political authorities fail to make sound decisions, often faces a grim outcome. This pattern can be observed in events such as Georgia’s conflict in 2008 or Ukraine’s ongoing crisis over the past three years. This raises a fundamental question: what is the root of the problem? To understand, we must first consider that the emergence of states on the political map is not arbitrary. Every state fulfills a specific geopolitical role shaped by factors such as geographical location, resilience, interactions with neighboring countries, and other unique characteristics.

Many states, especially smaller ones, are naturally destined as buffer states. A buffer state is a country located between two rival or potentially hostile great powers, and its existence can sometimes prevent conflicts between them. The role of buffer states is to act as protective barriers or intermediate zones, absorbing external shocks and balancing the power dynamics of neighboring nations. These states also have opportunities to leverage their strategic position for economic growth, such as through interstate routes and logistical systems. However, there is another side to this dynamic. Failing to fulfill the role of a buffer state can result in disastrous consequences, including state collapse.

Looking at Europe, we can identify notable examples of buffer states that emerged and thrived due to their roles. Belgium is a classic case, serving as a buffer among France, Germany, the Netherlands, and even the United Kingdom. It is no coincidence that after World War II, Brussels became the capital of the European Union, symbolizing Belgium’s critical role in maintaining balance and harmony among these powers.

Similarly, Poland once acted as a buffer between Russia and Germany. However, during the 18th and 19th centuries, Poland’s buffer role was disrupted. The country was partitioned and disappeared from the map, divided among the Austro-Hungarian, Prussian, and Russian Empires. This occurred when Western Europe no longer prioritized Poland as a buffer against Russia. These examples of both successful and failed buffer states are instructive. Turning to the South Caucasus—a region that functions as a buffer among Russia, Iran, and Turkey—we find similar dynamics.

In this region, each country has a specific buffer role. Georgia acts as a buffer between Russia and Turkey, Azerbaijan between Iran and Russia, and Armenia primarily between Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Georgia, after experiencing the consequences of severing ties with Russia, has since sought to mend the relationship.

Armenia, meanwhile, serves as a critical buffer between Russia and Iran. However, signs of retreating from this role have emerged under the incumbent government’s policies, raising concerns about the country’s future viability and questioning its existence.

Azerbaijan faces its own geopolitical temptations. Positioned as a buffer between Iran and Russia, it often aligns closely with Turkey. However, as they say, even a cunning fox may be caught in a trap. Yet, this alliance with its "Big Brother" could upset the regional balance. Should tensions escalate between Turkey and its neighbors—Russia or Iran—Azerbaijan may find itself in an unenviable position, vulnerable to regional power struggles.

If any of the three South Caucasus countries ignores these lessons, it risks becoming a "second Ukraine." Ukraine’s failure to adopt a neutral stance, to serve as a communication hub and bridge between Russia and Europe, led to catastrophic consequences. The outcome of these decisions is evident to the world. Only time will reveal which nation might be next.

The Armenian Center for National and International Studies

Yerznkian 75, 0033
Yerevan, Armenia

Tel.:

+374 10 528780 / 274818

Website:

www.acnis.am

  

The views of the authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Center.

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