The geopolitical shifts in the Middle East present both significant dangers and opportunities for Armenia. Among the potential risks are escalating conflicts involving Turkey and Iran, compounded by the volatile situations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which remain far from stable. Inevitably, Armenia cannot remain unaffected by these developments. However, these challenges are accompanied by opportunities that could reshape the country’s geopolitical profile.

It is evident that Armenia serves as a key obstacle to the direct connection between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. This connection has already been formalized through the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), with many of its sessions held in Nakhichevan. This is a clear indication that Armenia obstructs the practical realization of this connection. Meanwhile, Armenia's role as a "wedge" in this scenario is a defining feature of its geopolitical significance. Depending on the interests of the countries involved at any given time, this role can either enhance or diminish Armenia's strategic importance.

The establishment of Kurdistan, which will inevitably happen sooner or later, is of significant importance to us. The main concern, however, is whether Armenia (difficult as it is to admit) may survive until Kurdistan becomes a reality. This raises an essential question: What benefits could the creation of a Kurdish state bring to Armenia? Experts propose several promising considerations regarding Kurdistan's potential emergence in the region.

First, Armenia would gain a neighbor unburdened by genocide complexes and historical grievances, making it possible to establish genuine and unhindered good-neighborly relations. As Armenians are a forgiving people, they tolerate the negative role played by certain Kurdish tribes during the Armenian Genocide. It is important to remember that in the Ottoman Empire, many Kurds were merely instruments of higher powers. Furthermore, we must not forget that several Kurds sheltered Armenian families, saving them from mass slaughter or helping them reach safety.

Second, the emergence of Kurdistan would diminish the relevance of the "one nation, two states" formula that currently unites Azerbaijan and Turkey. This could compel Azerbaijan to grapple with a crisis of national identity, potentially leading to destabilizing effects within the country, including threats to its territorial integrity and the cohesion of its national structure.

Third, by shifting the role of the "wedge" in the Turkish world to Kurdistan, Armenia may lose some of its geopolitical significance. However, this shift would also provide Armenia with an opportunity to establish normal relations with its neighbors and free itself from the "brotherhood" imposed by superpowers due to its strategic position as a wedge. Fourth, the quality of relations between Turkey and Armenia would likely change. Turkey’s challenges with Kurdistan will not cease, given the densely Kurdish-populated areas and the growing demographic influence of Kurds within Turkey itself. The Kurdish issue will remain a significant concern for Turkey, potentially reshaping its regional priorities.

In this context, Azerbaijan's urgency to resolve the Artsakh issue becomes clearer. Baku is acutely aware that the matter remains unresolved and that time is not on its side.