A destructive thesis has recently been circulating in Armenia. Its essence is this: since regime change cannot be achieved through elections, the only remaining option is to pursue it exclusively through street rebellion. In other words, a method that we have repeatedly attempted—and failed—over the past four years. The government has consistently managed to neutralize the threat of street protests through police force and repression, culminating in the infamous events of June 12, 2024. On that day, stun and shrapnel grenades—prohibited weapons—were used against peaceful protesters.

During the clashes between rally participants and police on Baghramyan Avenue, approximately 100 people were injured, including those with shrapnel wounds. One citizen lost a wrist to grenade explosions, another lost a foot, and a third lost fingers. These violent events shattered the spirit of street resistance, leading to the gradual decline of the "Sacred Struggle." People came to understand that Armenia’s highest authorities, desperate to cling to power, were willing to resort to anything—even bloodshed.

In parallel with this narrative, another thesis has emerged. According to this view, only "death warriors"—individuals prepared to die and who believe they have nothing left to lose, including their lives—can bring about regime change through street protests. Let us set aside the fact that such individuals seemingly do not exist, particularly among those promoting this narrative. Moreover, there is no viable methodology for achieving regime change through such means. Even the rebellion of the Armed Forces General Headquarters—the so-called "Armenian coup d'état"—failed to result in regime change, despite occurring in the aftermath of the treacherously mismanaged 44-day war.

The question of who promotes and propagates the idea of street rebellions as a mechanism for regime change, and why they do so, is a separate topic of discussion. However, one of the primary drivers of this discourse is the perceived impossibility of coming to power through elections. Throughout Armenia’s post-independence period, there has been little precedent for regime change via elections. The most recent example was the snap parliamentary elections in June 2021, in which the capitulator who disgracefully lost the war secured victory by misusing administrative resources.

Let us suppose that the so-called death warriors succeed in carrying out a regime change. Naturally, in such a scenario, the death warriors themselves—or the individuals and groups backing them with the necessary "resources"—would assume power. This would reduce the significance of a crucial political process in Armenia—elections—to a mere exchange of one adventurer without a plan for another suicide attacker, equally devoid of a program. To draw a comparison: just as it is impossible to form a disciplined and combat-ready army from unorganized freedom fighters, it is equally impossible to establish a stable governance system with street-level death warriors.

Until Armenia achieves legitimate regime change—through political processes with broad, conscious public support, whether through regular or snap elections—we will not have a sustainable future. And if it becomes evident that the Armenian people are fundamentally unable to change their government through legitimate elections, then perhaps the last emigrant will have the solemn duty of turning out the lights at Zvartnots Airport.