When we fail to realize our own mistakes and don't learn from them, we are doomed to repeat them in the future with far graver consequences. We do not try to analyze and draw conclusions about the reasons for the defeat in the 44-day Artsakh war in political, military, psychological, ideological, and intellectual terms. Instead of making such a thorough analysis, the political, semi-political, and media fields are flooded with the search for culprits. The question of "who is to blame" has obscured the question of "why did it happen this way?"

We have an impression that blame-seekers on all sides are mostly busy trying to cover up their share of the blame. In fact, many are to blame, both the former and the present officials, those who consider themselves politicians and preachers of "peace" by order, and those who are the high-ranking military and the grayness called "civil society". All those who are looking for the culprits are pointing the arrows from themselves to the other side, and the search for the culprit does not give the answer to the main question: "why did it happen that way?" In other words, the moment of what was done wrong remains unexplained, without which there can be no hope for the future.

The probability that we will find the answer to that mistake (or mistakes) is small, the beneficiaries of not finding them are many and are in all camps. But let's try to focus on just one issue: the missed opportunity or expediency of recognizing the independence of Artsakh.

The claim that it was impossible to recognize the independence of Artsakh for 30 years is a blatant lie. With the precedents of Kosovo and Cyprus, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we see that it was possible and that Artsakh should have been recognized by Armenia a long time ago. In that case, the conflict would have a different nuance, the issue would be discussed in a different dimension and on other platforms.

It was an even bigger mistake that the issue of Artsakh and, in connection with it, the fate of Syunik was considered exclusively in the context of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations when it depends on the balance of forces of more influential players. The precedents of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia show that the interested parties recognize the independence of this or that entity, if necessary, based on their interests, including for the purpose of creating and maintaining security zones.

It was no coincidence that after the 44-day war, the Russian president's statement that Armenia never recognized the independence of Artsakh, implied that in that unrecognized situation, they had to get Azerbaijan's consent to deploy military personnel in Artsakh. The misconception that it is impossible to recognize the independence of Artsakh was formed in the 1990s and was justified by the intention of establishing normal relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, at the expense of Artsakh. Similarly, the thesis that if we extend a hand of friendship, there will be no more problems with the neighbors was not correct either.

Today we see that the problem is not Artsakh, but, first of all, Syunik, which is of great geopolitical importance and is connected with East-West, North-South roads, and such roads are factors affecting the geopolitical arrangement. If Armenia does not dispute Azerbaijan's jurisdiction over Artsakh, then only one thesis remains, the well-known thesis of Azerbaijan. And other players naturally build their policies based on that thesis.

This is the problem of only one dimension of the defeat, but even public understanding is not formed around it.